Are pure mental states conceivable?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2021-6-1-95-97Keywords:
Bogdan Faul, minimal dualism, conceivability argument, ignorance hypothesisAbstract
The article gives critical objections to the minimal dualism argument proposed by Bogdan Faul. It is demonstrated that
the method of introspection used by B. Faul in his article in order to explain subject’s access to their own mental states
undermines the validity of the proposed argument.
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