Minimal dualism and epistemic approach
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2021-6-1-86-90Keywords:
conceivability, possibility, minimal dualism, epistemic strategy, conceivability argumentAbstract
In this paper the author presents an argument in favor of minimal dualism — thesis, according to which conscious agents
are able to exist without bodies. Author demonstrates the advantages of this argument. Firstly, he shows that this argument
is invulnerable to the epistemic strategy of criticizing the conceivability argument. Secondly, the epistemic approach
restricts the conceivability of creatures, the possibility of which is incompatible with the minimal dualism.
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Published
2021-02-20
How to Cite
Faul Б. В. (2021). Minimal dualism and epistemic approach. Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity, 6(1), 86–90. https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2021-6-1-86-90
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