Incidental knowledge defended
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2025-10-3-92-100Keywords:
epistemic happenstance, virtue epistemology, epistemic luck, epistemology, knowledge, randomness, intellectual virtues.Abstract
The paper analyses epistemic happenstance and argues for the possibility of incidental knowledge. It considers how minimal concepts of knowledge, reflecting various basic intuitions, operate in situations where there is an influence of chance or fortunate circumstances. Based on this, a distinction is made between epistemic coincidence and epistemic causation randomness. Both types of epistemic happenstance are broader alternatives to the narrow understanding of epistemic luck that has developed in contemporary epistemology. As an example, the influence of the epistemic causation randomness on the formation of intellectual virtues is considered.
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