Teletransportation, Replication and Mereology
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2024-9-4-81-98Keywords:
personal identity, teletransporter, survival, supervenience, mereorganic continuity, compositional continuity.Abstract
The paper criticizes pessimistic views on survival into teletransporter. It is considered, in particular, the recent attempt of Alexey Kardash and Konstantin Morozov to defend the pessimists’ views by means of the criterion of mereorganic continuity. This defence faces two serious problems. Firstly, it is based on a fundamentally flawed description of the mechanics of teleportation. Under the guise of teletransportation, the procedure discussed is quite different – replication (creation of a perfect copy for some original object from suitable matter). Secondly, the prohibition on the survival of objects by instantaneous replacement of all their parts derived from the criterion of mereorganic continuity cannot be component of any consistent (yet plausible) mereology.
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