New version of derivative consequence argument and response to objections

Authors

  • Bogdan Vladimirovich Faul Institute of Philosophy, Saint Petersburg, Russia

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2020-5-4-72-74

Keywords:

derivative consequence argument, free will, laws of nature, moral responsibility

Abstract

In this paper, I respond to the objections and comments, which are raised by D. Razeev, T. Demin, and M. Sekatskaya.
I provide a new formulation of the argument, which avoids all the problems mentioned by these philosophers in their
papers and at the conferences.

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Author Biography

Bogdan Vladimirovich Faul, Institute of Philosophy, Saint Petersburg, Russia

Graduate Student, Assistant Researcher of Institute Philosophy.

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Abstract views: 18

Published

2020-12-09

How to Cite

Faul Б. В. (2020). New version of derivative consequence argument and response to objections. Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity, 5(4), 72–74. https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2020-5-4-72-74

Issue

Vol. 5 No. 4 (2020)

Section

Philosophy

Categories

License

Non-exclusive rights to the article are transferred to the journal in full accordance with the Creative Commons License BY-NC-SA 4.0 «Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 Worldwide License (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0»)

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