On derivative consequence argument
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2020-5-4-66-68Keywords:
Bogdan Faul, physicalism, laws of nature, free willAbstract
The article gives critical remarks to the derivative consequence argument proposed by Bogdan Faul. The first critical
remark concerns the ontological status of the laws of nature, the second remark deals with the term «physicalism».
It is demonstrated that conceptual vagueness of the terms used by B. Faul in his article undermines the validity of the
proposed derivative argument.
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