The Concept of a Person

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2024-9-2-141-145

Keywords:

person, quasi person, personal identity, natural kinds, phase sortals

Abstract

The essay contains a critique of the metaphysical ways to use of the term ‘person’. Since the term does not designate any natural kind, philosophers must abandon the question ‘what constitutes the continued existence of a person?’. It’s just a bad question. All well-defined questions about identity (‘what is human animal identity?’, ‘what is human mind identity?’, and so on) should formulate only in terms of natural kinds.

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Author Biography

Nekhaev Andrei Viktorovich, Omsk State Technical University, Omsk, Russia

Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Associate Professor, Professor of History, Philosophy and Social Communications Department, Omsk State Technical University, Omsk; Professor of Philosophy Department, Tyumen State University, Tyumen; Research Associate of the Laboratory of Logical and Philosophical Studies, Tomsk Scientific Center, Siberian Branch, Russian Academy of Sciences, Tomsk.

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Abstract views: 41

Published

2024-05-21

How to Cite

Nekhaev А. В., & К. МакГинн. (2024). The Concept of a Person. Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity, 9(2), 141–145. https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2024-9-2-141-145

Issue

Vol. 9 No. 2 (2024)

Section

Philosophy

Categories

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