Punishing (Not)Innocent Persons?

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2023-8-3-73-94

Keywords:

personal identity, moral responsibility, type-token theory, psychological sequentialism, punishment of the innocent, agency equivalence, culpability

Abstract

This article provides a critical analysis of Mark Walker’s type-token theory. This theory purports to describe, explain, and justify the mechanism by which moral and legal responsibility can be attributed to exact and complete duplicates of persons. However, Walker’s defence of the view of persons as abstract entities is met with several metaphysical objections. Alternatively, a new approach to moral and legal responsibility is developed based on principles of agency law, in which the conception of a guilty person does not require identity with the person who committed the culpable act.

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Author Biography

Nekhaev Andrei Viktorovich, Omsk State Technical University, Omsk, Russia

Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Associate Professor, Professor of History, Philosophy and Social Communications Department, Omsk State Technical University, Omsk; Professor of Philosophy Department, Tyumen State University, Tyumen; Research Associate of the Laboratory of Logical and Philosophical Studies, Tomsk Scientific Center, Siberian Branch, Russian Academy of Sciences, RAS, Tomsk.

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Abstract views: 91

Published

2023-09-28

How to Cite

Nekhaev А. В. (2023). Punishing (Not)Innocent Persons?. Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity, 8(3), 73–94. https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2023-8-3-73-94

Issue

Vol. 8 No. 3 (2023)

Section

Philosophy

Categories

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Non-exclusive rights to the article are transferred to the journal in full accordance with the Creative Commons License BY-NC-SA 4.0 «Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 Worldwide License (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0»)

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