Will I Be a Dead Person?

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2021-6-3-78-82

Keywords:

personal identity, corpse, animalism, psychological criterion, psychological continuity

Abstract

Eric Olsen argues from the fact that we once existed as fetal individuals to the conclusion that the Standard View of personal identity is mistaken. I shall establish that a similar argument focusing upon dead people opposes Olson’s favored Biological View of personal identity.

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Author Biography

Andrei Viktorovich Nekhaev, Omsk State Technical University, Omsk, Russia

Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor of History, Philosophy and Social Communications Department, Omsk State Technical University; Professor of Philosophy Department, Tyumen State University; Research Associate of the Laboratory of Logical and Philosophical Studies, Tomsk
Scientific Center, Siberian Branch, Russian Academy of Sciences, RAS.

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Abstract views: 35

Published

2021-10-05

How to Cite

Nekhaev А. В., & У. Р. Картер. (2021). Will I Be a Dead Person? . Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity, 6(3), 78–82. https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2021-6-3-78-82

Issue

Vol. 6 No. 3 (2021)

Section

Philosophy

Categories

License

Non-exclusive rights to the article are transferred to the journal in full accordance with the Creative Commons License BY-NC-SA 4.0 «Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 Worldwide License (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0»)

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