Bertrand Russell’s epistemology: towards neutral monism

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2022-7-1-84-90

Keywords:

epistemology, empiricism, methodological principles, knowledgeacquaintance, neutral monism, Bertrand Russell

Abstract

The article presents the evolution of the ideological views of the British philosopher Bertrand Russell on the nature of knowledge and the methodological principles underlying the cognition theory. It examines arguments showing the gradual change tendency of Russell’s epistemology towards neutral monism as a concept that removes the contradictions between the mental and physical in matters of cognition of the surrounding world.

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Author Biography

Anton Borisovich Didikin, National Research University Higher School of Economics

Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Candidate of Law, Professor of Faculty of Law, School for Theory of Law and Cross-Sectoral Legal Disciplines, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow

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Published

2022-03-09

How to Cite

Didikin А. Б. (2022). Bertrand Russell’s epistemology: towards neutral monism. Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity, 7(1), 84–90. https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2022-7-1-84-90

Issue

Vol. 7 No. 1 (2022)

Section

Philosophy

Categories

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