Semantics of legal concepts and natural kind terms: D. Patterson’s arguments

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DOI:

https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2021-6-2-94-98

Keywords:

legal language, legal concepts, normativity, semantics, natural kinds, facts, legal reality

Abstract

The paper is devoted to the analysis of the arguments of the american legal philosopher Dennis Patterson regarding the applicability of the natural kinds terms to the semantics of the legal language. Based on the Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law, reasonable criticized by D. Patterson, the features of the formation and interpretation of legal concepts are considered. Arguments are presented that demonstrate
the content of R. Dworkin and D. Patterson’s methodological approach to the interpretation of the semantics of legal concepts as well as argumentation regarding the normativity of legal reality, the objects of which are displayed in the content of legal concepts.

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Author Biography

Anton Borisovich Didikin, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia

Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Candidate of Law, Professor of Faculty of Law, School for Theory of Law and Cross-sectoral Legal Disciplines.

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Published

2021-05-31

How to Cite

Didikin А. Б. (2021). Semantics of legal concepts and natural kind terms: D. Patterson’s arguments. Omsk Scientific Bulletin. Series Society. History. Modernity, 6(2), 94–98. https://doi.org/10.25206/2542-0488-2021-6-2-94-98

Issue

Vol. 6 No. 2 (2021)

Section

Philosophy

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